Risk Factors of Situational Awareness Technology and Strategic Stability

Analysis

By Rebecca Hersman, Reja Younis, Bryce Farabaugh, Andrew Reddie, and Bethany Goldblum

Published April 8, 2020

Advanced Strategic SA Capabilities and Stability Risks

Strategic stability generally depends upon the combination of the absence of incentives to use nuclear weapons first (crisis stability) and the absence of incentives to build up a nuclear force (arms race stability).¹ Schelling was the first to posit that crisis stability occurs “if neither side has or perceives an incentive to use nuclear weapons first out of the fear that the other side is about to do so.”² Arms race stability, on the other hand, generally refers to a situation in which neither side has the incentive to augment their forces—qualitatively or quantitatively—based on the fear that their opponent could gain a meaningful advantage.³ While strategic stability depends upon factors including successful crisis management, decreasing incentives to use nuclear weapons, and reducing incentives for longer-term arms races, this study focuses broadly on the escalatory pressures in crisis that could be influenced positively or negatively by the emerging strategic SA ecosystem- including those pressure points that could appear well below the nuclear threshold.

All the strategic SA capabilities considered in this study can, to some degree, introduce risks for strategic stability. These risks can be characterized as: intrusive, destructive, predictive, preemptive, dual-use, clandestine, vulnerable, and action-enabling. Like the attributes in the previous chapter, some risk factors are more common than others: for example, many technologies may be considered “action-enabling,” as they enable military options that were previously difficult to achieve. The study team developed and used a set of stability risk factors to evaluate the extent and manner in which escalatory risk—either in terms of creating incentives for escalatory military action that might prove uncontrollable or increase the likelihood of miscalculation with escalatory outcomes—could be associated with emerging SA capabilities. These risk factors are elaborated upon in Figure 3.1. This common set of criteria allowed for more consistent comparisons across the range of different technologies in terms of evaluating their risk potential. Figure 3.1 defines each of these escalatory risk factors and provide illustrative examples.

James M. Acton, “Reclaiming Strategic Stability,” in Strategic Stability: Contending Interpretations, Elbridge A. Colby and Michael S. Gerson, eds., (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2014), 117–146. ↩
Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980). ↩
Acton, “Reclaiming Strategic Stability.” ↩

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About the Authors

Rebecca Hersman Director, Project on Nuclear Issues and Senior Advisor, International Security Program

Rebecca Hersman is director of the Project on Nuclear Issues and senior adviser for the International Security Program. Ms. Hersman joined CSIS in April 2015 from the Department of Defense (DOD), where she served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for countering weapons of mass destruction (WMD) since 2009. In this capacity, she led DOD policy and strategy to prevent WMD proliferation and use, reduce and eliminate WMD risks and respond to WMD dangers. Prior to joining DOD, Ms. Hersman was a senior research fellow with the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction at the National Defense University from 1998 to 2009. Her primary projects focused on the role of DOD in mitigating the effects of chemical and biological weapons attack, concepts and strategies for eliminating an adversary’s WMD programs, as well as proliferation issues facing the United States. Ms. Hersman also founded and directed the WMD Center’s Program for Emerging Leaders, an initiative designed to shape and support the next generation of leaders from across the U.S. government with interest in countering weapons of mass destruction. Ms. Hersman previously held positions as an international affairs fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, a special assistant to the undersecretary of defense for policy, and a member of the House Armed Services Committee professional staff. She holds an M.A. in Arab studies from Georgetown University and a B.A. from Duke University.

Reja Younis Program Manager and Research Associate, Project on Nuclear Issues

Reja Younis is a program manager and research associate with the Project on Nuclear Issues in the International Security Program at CSIS. Prior to working at CSIS, she completed a year-long fellowship with The Stimson Center, where she conducted research on nuclear deterrence challenges, crisis dynamics, and great power competition in the context of South Asia. She has also worked as a research analyst for the Chicago Project on Political Violence and has served as an editorial writer and subeditor of the Opinion and Editorial section for the Tribune newspaper. She holds a bachelor’s degree in social sciences and liberal arts from the Institute of Business Administration Karachi and a master’s degree in international relations from the University of Chicago.

Bryce Farabaugh Research Intern, Project on Nuclear Issues

Bryce Farabaugh is a research intern with the Project on Nuclear Issues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Prior to joining CSIS, Bryce held positions as a research intern at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, a policy intern with the Defense and Foreign Policy Department at the Niskanen Center, and worked for several years at the United States Department of the Treasury. He graduated cum laude from the University of Washington after three years of study with a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and department options in International Security and Political Economy.

Andrew Reddie Postdoctoral Research Fellow, University of California, Berkeley and Deputy Director, Nuclear Policy Working Group

Andrew Reddie is a postdoctoral research fellow at the University of California, Berkeley. Previously, Andrew received his doctorate from the Charles and Louise Travers Department of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. He currently serves as deputy director for the Nuclear Policy Working Group and as a researcher for the Department of Nuclear Engineering, Goldman School of Public Policy, Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity, and Berkeley Asia-Pacific Study Center at UC Berkeley as well as a researcher with the Project on Nuclear Gaming. He is also a Nuclear Science and Security Consortium (NSSC) Fellow and Bridging the Gap (BtG) Fellow. He holds an MPhil in International Relations from Oxford University as well as an M.A. and a B.A. (hons.) from the University of California, Berkeley. Andrew has also held research and editorial roles at the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Business and Politics, the Canadian International Council, and the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC. Andrew’s work has appeared in a variety of academic and policy-oriented publications including Science, Journal of Cyber Policy, and the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists.

Bethany Goldblum Associate Research Engineer, University of California Berkeley and Director, Nuclear Policy Working Group

Bethany L. Goldblum is an Associate Research Engineer in the Department of Nuclear Engineering at the University of California, Berkeley. Goldblum also serves as Executive Director for the Nuclear Science and Security Consortium, a multi-institution initiative established by the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration to conduct research and development supporting the nation’s nonproliferation mission while expanding the talent pipeline. Her research explores fundamental and applied nuclear physics, scintillator characterization, multi-source analytics, experimental wargaming, and nuclear security policy. Goldblum leads the Bay Area Neutron Group, a research team focused on applied neutron physics for nuclear security applications, and founded and directs the Nuclear Policy Working Group, an interdisciplinary team of scholars developing policy solutions to strengthen global nuclear security. She has been involved with the Public Policy and Nuclear Threats Boot Camp nearly since its inception, and acted as director of the program since 2014. Goldblum maintains active collaborations with the US DOE National Laboratories, and is an affiliate at Lawrence Berkeley, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia National Laboratories. She is author or co-author of more than 60 scientific publications. Goldblum received a Ph.D. in Nuclear Engineering from the University of California, Berkeley.

About the Authors

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