Understanding Situational Awareness Technologies and the Emerging Situational Awareness Ecosystem

Analysis

By Rebecca Hersman, Reja Younis, Bryce Farabaugh, Andrew Reddie, and Bethany Goldblum

Published April 6, 2020

The rapid expansion of new and existing technologies can provide opportunities for major breakthroughs in the ability to detect threats; track hostile actions and forces; process, interpret and communicate vast data sets; and predict and shape the actions and possibly even decisions of adversaries. Every technology has costs and benefits associated with its adoption, and the capabilities in the emerging strategic SA ecosystem are no different. Each of the emerging capabilities explored over the course of this project can be described using two separate categories: attributes for increasing strategic SA (discussed in this chapter) and risk factors that decrease strategic stability (addressed in the next chapter).

Platforms, Critical Enablers, and Defense and Counter Capabilities

The new technologies that will shape the strategic SA ecosystem moving forward can be divided into several broad categories. For the purposes of understanding and analyzing SA technologies and their effect on strategic stability, this study draws a distinction between “platforms” and “critical enablers.” “Platforms,” such as satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), or even microchip-enabled proximity cards, are the physical systems or structures necessary to access a collection target, carry a variety of sensor payloads, and support communications and data transmission from the sensor package. “Critical enablers,” on the other hand, are the sensors, applications, or other technologies used to collect or analyze SA data many of which can be used on or in support of a variety of platforms. In the examples above, these would be the sensors attached to a UAV or the digital applications which collect and analyze data collected by those sensors. Technological advancement and innovation have been key to the development of both platforms and critical enablers. For example, advances in miniaturization, autonomy, robotics, and other technologies have led to the development of platforms that are smaller, more mobile and agile, and harder to detect. To better analyze the individual technology and the costs and benefits associated with employing it, platforms and critical enablers may be treated as a distinct for academic or theoretical purposes. However, in real-world scenarios, a critical enabler is useful only after its marriage with a platform that can put it into position to gather and process desired information.

Finally, in addition to platforms and critical enablers, this project also explored some strategic SA capabilities that may be termed “defense” or “countering.” These capabilities contribute to the strategic SA ecosystem differently than most platform-critical enabler combinations: whereas most strategic SA capabilities focus on collecting information that can be used to inform decisionmakers during crisis or conflict, defense and countering capabilities either defend against adversary activities (for example, cognitive electronic warfare systems tasked with detecting, suppressing, and neutralizing adversary cyber intrusions) or seek to counter or degrade an adversary’s strategic SA (such as through spoofing activities that can obfuscate an adversary’s ability to perceive the operating environment). Together, defense and countering capabilities account for a small number of capabilities explored during this project, but such technologies may play an outsized role in escalation dynamics during future crises or conflicts given their potentially destructive nature and relevance to gray zone tactics.¹

Melissa Dalton et al., By Other Means Part II: Adapting to Compete in the Gray Zone (Washington, DC: CSIS, August 2019), https://www.csis.org/analysis/other-means-part-ii-adapting-compete-gray-zone. ↩

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About the Authors

Rebecca Hersman Director, Project on Nuclear Issues and Senior Advisor, International Security Program

Rebecca Hersman is director of the Project on Nuclear Issues and senior adviser for the International Security Program. Ms. Hersman joined CSIS in April 2015 from the Department of Defense (DOD), where she served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for countering weapons of mass destruction (WMD) since 2009. In this capacity, she led DOD policy and strategy to prevent WMD proliferation and use, reduce and eliminate WMD risks and respond to WMD dangers. Prior to joining DOD, Ms. Hersman was a senior research fellow with the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction at the National Defense University from 1998 to 2009. Her primary projects focused on the role of DOD in mitigating the effects of chemical and biological weapons attack, concepts and strategies for eliminating an adversary’s WMD programs, as well as proliferation issues facing the United States. Ms. Hersman also founded and directed the WMD Center’s Program for Emerging Leaders, an initiative designed to shape and support the next generation of leaders from across the U.S. government with interest in countering weapons of mass destruction. Ms. Hersman previously held positions as an international affairs fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, a special assistant to the undersecretary of defense for policy, and a member of the House Armed Services Committee professional staff. She holds an M.A. in Arab studies from Georgetown University and a B.A. from Duke University.

Reja Younis Program Manager and Research Associate, Project on Nuclear Issues

Reja Younis is a program manager and research associate with the Project on Nuclear Issues in the International Security Program at CSIS. Prior to working at CSIS, she completed a year-long fellowship with The Stimson Center, where she conducted research on nuclear deterrence challenges, crisis dynamics, and great power competition in the context of South Asia. She has also worked as a research analyst for the Chicago Project on Political Violence and has served as an editorial writer and subeditor of the Opinion and Editorial section for the Tribune newspaper. She holds a bachelor’s degree in social sciences and liberal arts from the Institute of Business Administration Karachi and a master’s degree in international relations from the University of Chicago.

Bryce Farabaugh Research Intern, Project on Nuclear Issues

Bryce Farabaugh is a research intern with the Project on Nuclear Issues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Prior to joining CSIS, Bryce held positions as a research intern at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, a policy intern with the Defense and Foreign Policy Department at the Niskanen Center, and worked for several years at the United States Department of the Treasury. He graduated cum laude from the University of Washington after three years of study with a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and department options in International Security and Political Economy.

Andrew Reddie Postdoctoral Research Fellow, University of California, Berkeley and Deputy Director, Nuclear Policy Working Group

Andrew Reddie is a postdoctoral research fellow at the University of California, Berkeley. Previously, Andrew received his doctorate from the Charles and Louise Travers Department of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. He currently serves as deputy director for the Nuclear Policy Working Group and as a researcher for the Department of Nuclear Engineering, Goldman School of Public Policy, Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity, and Berkeley Asia-Pacific Study Center at UC Berkeley as well as a researcher with the Project on Nuclear Gaming. He is also a Nuclear Science and Security Consortium (NSSC) Fellow and Bridging the Gap (BtG) Fellow. He holds an MPhil in International Relations from Oxford University as well as an M.A. and a B.A. (hons.) from the University of California, Berkeley. Andrew has also held research and editorial roles at the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Business and Politics, the Canadian International Council, and the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC. Andrew’s work has appeared in a variety of academic and policy-oriented publications including Science, Journal of Cyber Policy, and the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists.

Bethany Goldblum Associate Research Engineer, University of California Berkeley and Director, Nuclear Policy Working Group

Bethany L. Goldblum is an Associate Research Engineer in the Department of Nuclear Engineering at the University of California, Berkeley. Goldblum also serves as Executive Director for the Nuclear Science and Security Consortium, a multi-institution initiative established by the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration to conduct research and development supporting the nation’s nonproliferation mission while expanding the talent pipeline. Her research explores fundamental and applied nuclear physics, scintillator characterization, multi-source analytics, experimental wargaming, and nuclear security policy. Goldblum leads the Bay Area Neutron Group, a research team focused on applied neutron physics for nuclear security applications, and founded and directs the Nuclear Policy Working Group, an interdisciplinary team of scholars developing policy solutions to strengthen global nuclear security. She has been involved with the Public Policy and Nuclear Threats Boot Camp nearly since its inception, and acted as director of the program since 2014. Goldblum maintains active collaborations with the US DOE National Laboratories, and is an affiliate at Lawrence Berkeley, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia National Laboratories. She is author or co-author of more than 60 scientific publications. Goldblum received a Ph.D. in Nuclear Engineering from the University of California, Berkeley.

About the Authors

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