The Way Ahead

Analysis

By Rebecca Hersman, Reja Younis, Bryce Farabaugh, Andrew Reddie, and Bethany Goldblum

Published April 11, 2020

In crises between nuclear powers, the nuclear shadow will loom large. The emerging situational awareness (SA) ecosystem can create new risks but can also ameliorate them depending on how these capabilities are used and communicated. Indeed, finding a balance between risk and benefit in such a complex security environment while also maximizing the value of information to terminate a crisis or conflict on favorable terms will not happen automatically. This environment will also require new perspectives on the value and risks associated with information dominance and its impact on nuclear crises. Information dominance has been essential to ensuring U.S. military effectiveness, but in a combined conventional/nuclear ecosystem involving conflict between nuclear-armed adversaries, the picture is far more complex.

In the emerging strategic SA ecosystem, new technologies are transforming the way information is collected, analyzed, and acted upon during competition between rival states. The growing reliance on technology across the spectrum of conflict means decisionmakers will have to grapple with enormous amounts of information from widely varying and potentially unfamiliar sources and on compressed timeframes. This increasingly combined strategic SA ecosystem, including a wide array of SA technologies, along with critical enablers, can create uncertainty in the conventional and nuclear space that could create escalatory risks under crisis scenarios. Advances in numerous technologies, however, have vastly increased the importance of SA for conventional conflict, including through remote sensing, global positioning system (GPS) navigation, internet communications, cyber capabilities, and remotely piloted unmanned vehicles, among others. Today these systems are substantially more capable, but the increased speed and precision is accompanied by a lack of firebreaks that could slow crises from escalating to nuclear conflict.

The transformational nature of the strategic SA landscape suggests a second look is necessary to consider the risks these emerging capabilities may introduce as well as and the challenges they may pose for policy professionals, especially when employed in a crisis or conflict between nuclear-armed states. To effectively manage crisis escalation, decisionmakers must understand how the strategic SA ecosystem has evolved, appreciate the dynamic relationship between improved strategic SA and crisis stability, and recognize the complex interplay between technology, escalation, and decisionmaking. This report has tried to take an initial step toward that reconsideration and examine the characteristics of this new environment and its implications.

Download full The Way Ahead_6

About the Authors

Rebecca Hersman Director, Project on Nuclear Issues and Senior Advisor, International Security Program

Rebecca Hersman is director of the Project on Nuclear Issues and senior adviser for the International Security Program. Ms. Hersman joined CSIS in April 2015 from the Department of Defense (DOD), where she served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for countering weapons of mass destruction (WMD) since 2009. In this capacity, she led DOD policy and strategy to prevent WMD proliferation and use, reduce and eliminate WMD risks and respond to WMD dangers. Prior to joining DOD, Ms. Hersman was a senior research fellow with the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction at the National Defense University from 1998 to 2009. Her primary projects focused on the role of DOD in mitigating the effects of chemical and biological weapons attack, concepts and strategies for eliminating an adversary’s WMD programs, as well as proliferation issues facing the United States. Ms. Hersman also founded and directed the WMD Center’s Program for Emerging Leaders, an initiative designed to shape and support the next generation of leaders from across the U.S. government with interest in countering weapons of mass destruction. Ms. Hersman previously held positions as an international affairs fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, a special assistant to the undersecretary of defense for policy, and a member of the House Armed Services Committee professional staff. She holds an M.A. in Arab studies from Georgetown University and a B.A. from Duke University.

Reja Younis Program Manager and Research Associate, Project on Nuclear Issues

Reja Younis is a program manager and research associate with the Project on Nuclear Issues in the International Security Program at CSIS. Prior to working at CSIS, she completed a year-long fellowship with The Stimson Center, where she conducted research on nuclear deterrence challenges, crisis dynamics, and great power competition in the context of South Asia. She has also worked as a research analyst for the Chicago Project on Political Violence and has served as an editorial writer and subeditor of the Opinion and Editorial section for the Tribune newspaper. She holds a bachelor’s degree in social sciences and liberal arts from the Institute of Business Administration Karachi and a master’s degree in international relations from the University of Chicago.

Bryce Farabaugh Research Intern, Project on Nuclear Issues

Bryce Farabaugh is a research intern with the Project on Nuclear Issues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Prior to joining CSIS, Bryce held positions as a research intern at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, a policy intern with the Defense and Foreign Policy Department at the Niskanen Center, and worked for several years at the United States Department of the Treasury. He graduated cum laude from the University of Washington after three years of study with a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and department options in International Security and Political Economy.

Andrew Reddie Postdoctoral Research Fellow, University of California, Berkeley and Deputy Director, Nuclear Policy Working Group

Andrew Reddie is a postdoctoral research fellow at the University of California, Berkeley. Previously, Andrew received his doctorate from the Charles and Louise Travers Department of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. He currently serves as deputy director for the Nuclear Policy Working Group and as a researcher for the Department of Nuclear Engineering, Goldman School of Public Policy, Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity, and Berkeley Asia-Pacific Study Center at UC Berkeley as well as a researcher with the Project on Nuclear Gaming. He is also a Nuclear Science and Security Consortium (NSSC) Fellow and Bridging the Gap (BtG) Fellow. He holds an MPhil in International Relations from Oxford University as well as an M.A. and a B.A. (hons.) from the University of California, Berkeley. Andrew has also held research and editorial roles at the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Business and Politics, the Canadian International Council, and the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC. Andrew’s work has appeared in a variety of academic and policy-oriented publications including Science, Journal of Cyber Policy, and the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists.

Bethany Goldblum Associate Research Engineer, University of California Berkeley and Director, Nuclear Policy Working Group

Bethany L. Goldblum is an Associate Research Engineer in the Department of Nuclear Engineering at the University of California, Berkeley. Goldblum also serves as Executive Director for the Nuclear Science and Security Consortium, a multi-institution initiative established by the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration to conduct research and development supporting the nation’s nonproliferation mission while expanding the talent pipeline. Her research explores fundamental and applied nuclear physics, scintillator characterization, multi-source analytics, experimental wargaming, and nuclear security policy. Goldblum leads the Bay Area Neutron Group, a research team focused on applied neutron physics for nuclear security applications, and founded and directs the Nuclear Policy Working Group, an interdisciplinary team of scholars developing policy solutions to strengthen global nuclear security. She has been involved with the Public Policy and Nuclear Threats Boot Camp nearly since its inception, and acted as director of the program since 2014. Goldblum maintains active collaborations with the US DOE National Laboratories, and is an affiliate at Lawrence Berkeley, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia National Laboratories. She is author or co-author of more than 60 scientific publications. Goldblum received a Ph.D. in Nuclear Engineering from the University of California, Berkeley.

About the Authors

Related Reading