Pathways to Escalation

Analysis

By Rebecca Hersman, Reja Younis, Bryce Farabaugh, Andrew Reddie, and Bethany Goldblum

Published April 9, 2020

Of particular concern are three potential escalation pathways—provocation, entanglement, and information complexity—that may be triggered or exacerbated by the use of emerging strategic SA-enhancing capabilities. Although multiple pathways may be activated during an actual crisis, either simultaneously or sequentially, examining each of these escalatory pathways individually provides insight into the interplay of strategic SA technologies and stability risks.

Provocation

The active nature of the emerging strategic SA ecosystem means that states have the capability to penetrate adversary territory (via land, sea, and air) and networks to gain increasingly precise and potentially actionable information. However, the use of these capabilities risks discovery and response by the state under surveillance. Likewise, these capabilities may generate information that suggests the opening of an offensive window of opportunity, greatly increasing incentives to move first. Escalation through provocation occurs when parties to a crisis lack an ability to determine the offensive or defensive intentions behind a proposed action or information collection effort, greatly intensifying escalatory pressures. It may occur because:

▪ information collection efforts begin to influence rather than observe the course of a conflict or crisis (whether intentional or not) through intrusive or disruptive activity; or

▪ the rapid, precise, and persistent nature of SA capabilities creates opportunities or incentives to take action on a preemptive or preventive basis.

In other words, a provocation-based escalation cycle occurs when the use of these technologies is perceived in offensive terms by the country being observed (e.g., by illegal territorial intrusion) or the strategic SA capabilities afford a significant offensive or first-mover advantage to the observing state.

These provocation dynamics could play out through several different scenarios:

The use of intrusive technologies challenges legal and political concepts of sovereignty and is perceived as offensively intended (a territorial incursion can be perceived as an act of war regardless of its defensive intent);
The intended mission of these capabilities (general surveillance versus counterforce support or surveillance versus strike) is not readily identifiable and is misperceived;
Surveillance capabilities intentionally or unintentionally approach vital strategic assets as they conduct surveillance and therefore provoke a response;
Clandestine capabilities, such as active cyber surveillance, are discovered, prompting surprise and uncertainty as to risks and damage; and
Surveillance capabilities initiated for defensive purposes identify preemptive or action-enabling options, prompting a willingness to take an escalatory offensive action in hopes of terminating the crisis on favorable terms. Or, if the surveillance is detected or revealed, the country under surveillance may assume such intentions and undertake an escalatory step of its own.

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About the Authors

Rebecca Hersman Director, Project on Nuclear Issues and Senior Advisor, International Security Program

Rebecca Hersman is director of the Project on Nuclear Issues and senior adviser for the International Security Program. Ms. Hersman joined CSIS in April 2015 from the Department of Defense (DOD), where she served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for countering weapons of mass destruction (WMD) since 2009. In this capacity, she led DOD policy and strategy to prevent WMD proliferation and use, reduce and eliminate WMD risks and respond to WMD dangers. Prior to joining DOD, Ms. Hersman was a senior research fellow with the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction at the National Defense University from 1998 to 2009. Her primary projects focused on the role of DOD in mitigating the effects of chemical and biological weapons attack, concepts and strategies for eliminating an adversary’s WMD programs, as well as proliferation issues facing the United States. Ms. Hersman also founded and directed the WMD Center’s Program for Emerging Leaders, an initiative designed to shape and support the next generation of leaders from across the U.S. government with interest in countering weapons of mass destruction. Ms. Hersman previously held positions as an international affairs fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, a special assistant to the undersecretary of defense for policy, and a member of the House Armed Services Committee professional staff. She holds an M.A. in Arab studies from Georgetown University and a B.A. from Duke University.

Reja Younis Program Manager and Research Associate, Project on Nuclear Issues

Reja Younis is a program manager and research associate with the Project on Nuclear Issues in the International Security Program at CSIS. Prior to working at CSIS, she completed a year-long fellowship with The Stimson Center, where she conducted research on nuclear deterrence challenges, crisis dynamics, and great power competition in the context of South Asia. She has also worked as a research analyst for the Chicago Project on Political Violence and has served as an editorial writer and subeditor of the Opinion and Editorial section for the Tribune newspaper. She holds a bachelor’s degree in social sciences and liberal arts from the Institute of Business Administration Karachi and a master’s degree in international relations from the University of Chicago.

Bryce Farabaugh Research Intern, Project on Nuclear Issues

Bryce Farabaugh is a research intern with the Project on Nuclear Issues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Prior to joining CSIS, Bryce held positions as a research intern at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, a policy intern with the Defense and Foreign Policy Department at the Niskanen Center, and worked for several years at the United States Department of the Treasury. He graduated cum laude from the University of Washington after three years of study with a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and department options in International Security and Political Economy.

Andrew Reddie Postdoctoral Research Fellow, University of California, Berkeley and Deputy Director, Nuclear Policy Working Group

Andrew Reddie is a postdoctoral research fellow at the University of California, Berkeley. Previously, Andrew received his doctorate from the Charles and Louise Travers Department of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. He currently serves as deputy director for the Nuclear Policy Working Group and as a researcher for the Department of Nuclear Engineering, Goldman School of Public Policy, Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity, and Berkeley Asia-Pacific Study Center at UC Berkeley as well as a researcher with the Project on Nuclear Gaming. He is also a Nuclear Science and Security Consortium (NSSC) Fellow and Bridging the Gap (BtG) Fellow. He holds an MPhil in International Relations from Oxford University as well as an M.A. and a B.A. (hons.) from the University of California, Berkeley. Andrew has also held research and editorial roles at the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Business and Politics, the Canadian International Council, and the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC. Andrew’s work has appeared in a variety of academic and policy-oriented publications including Science, Journal of Cyber Policy, and the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists.

Bethany Goldblum Associate Research Engineer, University of California Berkeley and Director, Nuclear Policy Working Group

Bethany L. Goldblum is an Associate Research Engineer in the Department of Nuclear Engineering at the University of California, Berkeley. Goldblum also serves as Executive Director for the Nuclear Science and Security Consortium, a multi-institution initiative established by the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration to conduct research and development supporting the nation’s nonproliferation mission while expanding the talent pipeline. Her research explores fundamental and applied nuclear physics, scintillator characterization, multi-source analytics, experimental wargaming, and nuclear security policy. Goldblum leads the Bay Area Neutron Group, a research team focused on applied neutron physics for nuclear security applications, and founded and directs the Nuclear Policy Working Group, an interdisciplinary team of scholars developing policy solutions to strengthen global nuclear security. She has been involved with the Public Policy and Nuclear Threats Boot Camp nearly since its inception, and acted as director of the program since 2014. Goldblum maintains active collaborations with the US DOE National Laboratories, and is an affiliate at Lawrence Berkeley, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia National Laboratories. She is author or co-author of more than 60 scientific publications. Goldblum received a Ph.D. in Nuclear Engineering from the University of California, Berkeley.

About the Authors

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